Inflation in Russia: 1989-present by Fuhrman, Jeffrey L.
University of Northern Iowa 
UNI ScholarWorks 
Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) Honors Program 
1994 
Inflation in Russia: 1989-present 
Jeffrey L. Fuhrman 
University of Northern Iowa 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you 
Copyright ©1994 Jeffrey L. Fuhrman 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Fuhrman, Jeffrey L., "Inflation in Russia: 1989-present" (1994). Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 
2006). 69. 
https://scholarworks.uni.edu/pst/69 
This Open Access Presidential Scholars Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Program 
at UNI ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Presidential Scholars Theses (1990 – 2006) by an 
authorized administrator of UNI ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@uni.edu. 
loflation_in Russia: 1989-Present 
:,uhmi t ted in rcu-tial Fulfillment 
of the Fequirements of the 
University of Northern Iowa 
Presjdential Scholar Program 
12 May 1994 
by 




Russie suf f er.e tode.y fro:m an unprecedented combination of 
economic ails : an industrial depression verse than the .Aln.erican 
Great Depression; ralnpant cri:m.e a?".rl corruption; widespread 
une:mploy:ment ; falling producti Yi ty a.'>ld standards of li Ying ; 
political instability .: 91-..-l a lack of resolYe to address these 
problems _ Of course .. o:t1e cf the biggest problem2 Rue~ia faces is 
inflation. Prices rose more in Russia during the first week of 1994 
t-.han the'-T d;d 1· n the u.-.; tad Ste.tee, .-l,,.,..;nrr 1 aa3 1 
...,. •• 4 J ..a. .., V4,4 • .-. V - V"-"" V - ..... ~· _. ... ~ .. ., ., • 
The primary purpose of this paper is to review the literature 
that analyzes Russia·s economic transition and the causes of the 
inflation. Next , the paper analyzes what role the inflation plays 
in the current process of reform of the Russian economy. Finally, 
drawing from ti:-.ie experiences of other nations with similar 
histories, previous and possible policy options to remedy the 
inflation are discussed. 
~ussian Inflation History 
Nobel Laureate l1ilton Friedlrla.n, the major founder of the 
Uonetarist School of thought in Economics , wrote that " 'inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon .. . produced only by a 
more rapid increase in the quantity of money than in output . "''2 
1 "tndicators.," t.ummersa,1-n···: February 22., 1994 . no author., p. 3. 
~Friedman . Milton. "The Counter Revolution in Monetary Theon,1," Occasional Paper No. 33 
{London: ! EA- 'Ni ncot Foundation) , 19?0, p.24 .. ee quoterl in "Economic Stebi112etfon 1 r: 
the former Soviet Union: Lessons irom Mgenti na and Brazil" by William Moskoif and 
M3der Ns2mi, p. 70. 
Russia is not exe:pt fro~ this la~ : laBt year , vhile the R1..!3~ian 
Central Ban}: pursued an irregularly loose monetary policy_. consU!ller 
prices rose at a rate bet,;.;reen ten and thirty percent every m.onth. 3 
Tat,le 1 ( XolY!J}!ersE!·_1'Jt ', 1994 ) shows how credit le~,e ls ( roughly 
equivalent to monetary aggregates) rose in relation to the 
Ruble/ American Dollar excl"..anqe rate . 
l'Mqla 3 CooTHoweHMe KpeAMTHOM aaBKM . 
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Because the Dollar is a relati'ltely stable currency, tr.is graph shows 
distinctly hcT"T inflation from loose :monetary policy 1'..as eroded the 
value (ergo , purchasing po~er} cf the ruble. The solution then, 
would 3eem simple: tighten D1onetary policy L"l order to reduce 
inflation. Ho,;,:rever , this is neither a satisfactory answer nor a 
complete solution for stabili:!:ation of the Russian economy. 
Without a functioning economy, implementing selected and 
targeted policies has little effect . For example, implementing 
orthodox monetary policy before stabilizing political and economic 
expectations erodes livincr s tandards as well as public confidence in 
government.. On ttie other hand , enacting sweeping fiscal reforms 
without corresponding monetary discipline is futile : any gains made 
in productivity or living standards are absorbed or overtaken by 
inflation. 
!n order t o fully u-nrlerst.~-nn the inflation in Russia, so that 
solutions can be found , it is important to review underly-i.nq 
problems of the economy and the reasons why these problems exist . 
There are :ma.11y underlying causes of the current inflation in Russia , 
ranging from economic to cultural in origin. Furthermore , these 
problems are often so intrinsically related that it is ;ffipossible to 
3epara te them f rem each ether . E~ten so .. it is neceesar1T to isolate 
the major ce.t!s es cf inflaticn in Russia. toda.)" . 
T'ne most important cause of the inflation in Russia is the 
legacy of the centrally-planned Soviet economy. It is common to 
refer to excess money in a certain type of inflationary economy as 
an ·. overhang of money But, in this case, the ' hangover ' is more 
than just a monetary metaptior . Because the Soviet Union indulged in 
unsustainable and irresponsible economic practices for most of its 
seventy-four years , Russia must now face not only spiraling 
inflation, but hungry citizens, dried-up production, angry 
3 
pensioners , corruption. ar..d poli tice.l headaches. 
Central planninq severely hinders the Russian economy. 
Industrial production in Russia decline~ more than fifty-percent 
since 1990.4 Economic, and therefore, fiscal recovery present 
substantial challenqes . Poland, an economy Russia is often compared 
to, took nearly a decade to emerge from a central-planninq induced 
depression. 5 
tlicro-econolllic relationE , inclurlir..g domestic and inter-
republican , ha.Ye been seYerely l~ted by the dissolution of the 
So~tiet Union 3.!ld the eccr1olllic tr~~i tion. In this cage an anecdote 
prcYides the best exrunple : Because of the legacy of the old SoYiet 
system, cigarette tobacco rolling papers are produced in 
HoweYer . the glue to held the cigarettes together is :m.a..--iufactured m 
another republic. Since the dissolution of the SoYiet Union , 
coordin"9.tinq the resources to collect all three ra~~ :materials became 
an impossible task , p~hi:ng up the prices for cigarettes . 
Russian agricultural production is down 45 percent since 1990 .6 
Food industry productivity is down 35-40 percent . 7 
J. K1· r 1·c~e!i ,.. 111· k"t· ·4 . , " I ii" · 4 1· . - ., "r1·s1· - H· n,:. "'" • • L.:.· 4 " J.'· -· - · . ~~,::--' ·' ·' ..... ,.CL •• ,-.n .. . ·11 l r-U , l'C · 1 a, t: l di. lll<il. VII ()c. l., . ;i : Ui-·v V l t:;l u::>l , l\l.illlllltl-'<LII~ , I IQ II 1 1 I 77"'f. 
Seasonally adj usted , se':' Graph •4, p. 43. 
5 Maita I .. Shlomo and Ben-Zion f-11 l ner .. ··Russ1a and Poland: the Anatomy of Transition _." 
Challenge. September -October. 1993 .. pp . 40 - 47. 
6 v; r-i"h"'nko u; ki'a et al "I ntlatinn ll. Cr-ioio - '"'"n"' r;;.,,<> I aot " j"°;,n,~r~o,.j ·'·' M<>r-<'h 1 1 00 4 
1 ·, 11 1 \..• t V ,. ,I :1 1 .. . t ... , "''\.ollt. 1l 1 V'\o t .,_• 1t 'V-.., I 1V1 ..... IIVt' ..... L,IV V ....... ..., ,., 1 '1. V I IIIIIV t <V ..... 1 1 '\. • I IWI V I I } I J J . • 
p. 43. 
7 "Happiness b not in MooeiJ, C:veo i n its Quantity'· /..'~lmmer.51.int': December 21, i 993, No 
author , p. 28. 
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Food production is key to the econo:m.y. Pole..."ld for ex~le , 1res able 
to speed the traneition to a !!!arket eco~c~y, in part , becauee 
r~gging p:roble:m.s of f cod shortages dictn· t e~ist . Russia forcibly 
collectiYized its agricultural eyste?l 11r.ner the Soviets and depended 
more strongly on agricultural central pla1~~ing the-~ Polanrl. 
All of these factors drive inflation by decreasing public 
confidence in the functioninq of the economy. This results in 
behavior tr.aat accounts for inflation in advance, continuing the 
wage-price spiral. Food production for example, is critical to 
inf la tior.aary pressure . Since all people in an economy are affected 
by inflation of food prices, inefficiency in agriculture translates 
eventually into general consUJD.er-price inf lat.ion. :3 
Political instability is a.nether of the :me.jcr reason~ 
8 M<>;+<>] Shl"m" <>nd Ron- 7 ;nn M;lr,or p 4? 
• '-' ' "''-' .t I V t1V~ 1 ._,._,. ,.;_ ,._, ltfll .... } • - · 
5 
infle.tion is rampant in Russia today. Political -ir;~tability 
produces apathy and neglect on the part cf economic actors in a 
society. Because of this , i..11cree.sed precautions and unnue 
reluctance C!l the p~rt cf i!ldustrialists a_n~ bueinessperson.s 
r-esul ts. Peli ti cal instability also results m go .. rerll!!ent paralysis 
and ir..decisic11. Both cf these effects can lead to inflation. 
Because economic 
to cc~rer risk factors .· econo~ic prcd~ction slo;-rs to s. t-~l t . 
Because many industrialists still retain strong ties to the 
goverment leaders of the old Soviet Union, cheap credits are often 
delll8.nded from. the Central Bank. Such credits are different from. 
norlll8.l currency issues from. a central bank. These are direct, 
subsidized loans to individual industries. Often they are targeted 
toward factories and sectors that em.ploy large numbers of people . 
Rather than invest these credits in restntcturinq and renovation, 
they are u::sed to furt.t1er fund inefficient production and labor 
practices . -rney also serve as a substitute for :m.oney, continuir.iq 
the inflationary spiral. Although Central Bank Chairman Victor 
Gerashchenko has accom.plished a considerable lessening of credit 
extension since December 1993 , these subsidized loans continue the 
inflation problem. in Russia today. 
Bar.king proble:ms .· lack cf enf 01·ceable property la~·ts .· 
a1ld bureaucracy are ex~mrles of other factors tr.at continue the 
current inflation in Russia. Furthermore, all cf these factors 
contribute to an unbreakable circle: none of the prcble!IB can be 
sol Yed without the others being si:m.ul tanecusly addressed. Hm-reYer , 
6 
no one ha.s the political abili tI" to address all of the proble?ls 
concurrently. 
There is general disaqreem.ent a.bout the original causes of the 
inflation. On a qovernm.ental level, this paralyzes the process of 
establishing fiscal responsibility. Because of this, outside 
agencies, such as the HIF and World Bank, are reluctant to offer 
assistance. Before ana.11~iru;r possible policy solutions, it is 
ins true ti ve to review the origins of the inf la. tion. 
Is the inflation nov cost-push or dell.and pull? 
One of the :major reason3 inflation in Russia is such a serious 
problem. is the fact that aggregate demand exceeded aggreqate supply. 
For years , the inefficient Soviet econom.y9 produced an insufficient 
quantity of goods to fulfill the needs and wants of the Soviet 
people . That which wa.s produced was sold at regulated prices, or 
even rationed out . Everyone , except those unfortunate enouqh to be 
part of the huge prison/labor cam.p system, was paid wges and 
benefits, regardless of their productivity. Therefore, most goods 
and services during the Soviet period were illllllediately purchasable ; 
inflation was evident only in non-price factors , such as lines, 
shortages , and black :markets . 
This inequality In2.nifested itself as price inflation only 
during the 19.te 1980s a.."l!i early 1990s . Du.ring this ti.?:le, SoYiet 
9While the Russian economt) is not tt,e onl tJ successor to the Soviet economy. the only predecessor 
to the Ruesien economy 1e the Soviet economy. Unless other\.'ise steterl , ell further 
references in this paper to the Soviet Union wrn therefore assume oni y the Soviet 
Economy es it relates to preeent-day Ruseie. 
7 
leader l1ikbail S. GorbacheY began his econoI:lic reforms , Jr.nm.'n as 
Perestroika . ~ong ether actions , Gorbachev brought regulated 
prices closer to the actual costs of producing them. Later, RUEsian 
President Boris Yel ' tsi..11 , a.."ld his Prime tli.."lister/ .Advisor , Yegor 
Ge,idar .- freed :m.ost prices . 10 ~ith larqe a:m.cunts of 
8."i1'8.ilable, consumers fln.-t producers drove up prices . Si:m.ply put , 
Russia ~..as suffered in part : fro~ a Psnqover of rubles . These points 
support the hypothesi~ inf le. tic:?1 is 
inflation. 
In order for an inflationary spiral to exist , cost-push 
inflation must follow demand-pull inflation. Tnere are many 
arguments that support a hypothesis that cost-push inflation is a 
factor in the Russian economy. 
The first argu:m.ent that supports this hypothesis, is that 
there is not enough :m.oney left in the econo:m.y to continue de~-
pull inf le.tion. Sa~tir.ge ~-rere ~tirtus.111" ~-riped out in the s~er of 
1993 .· ~-rhen the gc"tterr..m.ent issued an edict tba t issued ne,;-r currency, 
s.?ld in"t."S.lids. ted old !:lo!lie~. Th;s edict allowed only seYeral 
thousand rubles to be returned in cash , the rest r~tas f creed into 
in~ccessible savings accounts . ~·Yi thcut s."tts.ilable cash sa,,..; T1~s to 
spend on goods av-.,-i og,y~,.; rr,,co -"-J · ·-'-·--~ de!:lS.r.d-pull i!1flation cculd net 
continue . 
The second , and m.ost powerful argument that the inflation in 
10 Brigitte Granville . "Price and Currency Reform in Russia arid in tt.e c:s," Russi&n ,j11d East 
Euro~i:,an Fi nf!nc-i:, and Tradi:,. Vol . 29 6 1, p. 6. 
8 
Rtissie. is not demand-pull inflation, is that prcductivit1r in R1~sia 
right now is lo't-r in all sectors of the econo:m.y. De:m.<11".'1 pull 
inflation can really cnly occur ,;rhen the eccnc:m.y is prcdu.c~ geed~ 
and ser~tices th.at people can purchase ~Ti th their earri ?"gs or excess 
savings . 'T'haraf nra ....... _ .. ___ ...__ , cost-push inflation must some role in the 
current inflation . 
.Another reason why cost-push inflation may be an underlyinq 
cause of inflation, is that the restrictions of the Soviet period 
ignored the normal increasing of costs in an economy. It can be 
arqued that this repressed cost-inflation has not yet been fully 
recurred . Tnerefore , industries continue to increase their costs to 
meet world price levels . 
Continued i..11f la tion has forced inf la ticn.e.ry expects. tic~, 
leading to a third kind of inflation : hyperinflation. ~~"hi le the 
t raditional {Cagan) definition of hyperinflation -- 5~ inflation 
per month -- bas net been reached statisticall1r i...~ Ruesia , the 
occurring. E1ttidence can be geen in the fact tr.at , 
duri?1g the fiscal periods 
Yel ·· t s in/Geidar ar1m;nistraticn, infle.tion ccnti..'t).Ued at a le~."el of 
Per ce~• ner mn~th 11 .. ...~ .., r .. -.v ......... . 
Iapacts of Inflation 
Inflation ha~ :many perr.;cic~ effect~ on any econc:m.y. li';..-c-t .. ........ -v , 
11 See t'iJ,,ili°/11t".;":fifil, Issues fro m fai i and vVi nter months uf i 993. See especiaii y " Econumic 
Indicators Cc\'eri r:g T\-.'O Years Df Reform ." December 21, 1993, p. 15, No author. 
9 
continuous inilation often leads to a decline in output . "SeYere 
inflation encour~ge~ e. diYer~icn cf effort tc~rd speculative, and 
airey from productive activity. "12 For evidence of this effect in 
Russia, He.ital and tliL~er write : 
"The streets of !foscow are lined ".;Ti th lnS.keshif t stalls , 
where everything illlaqina.ble is hawked . t.rany of those sta.lls 
~VQ ~t ~urbo;ne fo;c] ;n fynnt nf QkQ-~nnad otnvao • 
~• ~ ~ v - --- L-- ~ -•v - -• ~~v~- -v-•-- , 
privatizing those stores is painfully slow, so they sit idle 
and empty. All o~ter :t!osco,;¥ _. there are huge open l!larkets that 
rival any · suk ' ( open marketplace) in the l1iddle East. 
·.·. It looks , for ~tll the world, like an explosion of 
entrepreneurial activity. Apparently, many Russians get the 
i dea. Under capi te .. li3m. , the~r ~~~te lee.rned, }7 0U ~e l"Cur 
living by selling things other people want -- especially when 
there i8 no al terns. ti ~te ~-re.17 to make a li ~ting . u 
Another of the effects of inflation is the redistributive 
effect of inflation. Inflation acts as a tax on those who hold 
long-term investments , and on those who live on fixed incomes , such 
as pensioners . These effects are readily visible in Russia today , 
although inflationary wage-indexing and COLA·s are increasingly 
common. While these safeguards may protect people in the short-
term, they are extremely inflationary, and, consequently, 
ineffective in the medium- and long-terms . 
inflation i~ disrupti ~te to normal econc!:llc va1Qt ; n,...,o ... --- ...,. _. __ , 
a 11d. t o econo:m.ic planning . 13 Without reasonsble knm-;rledge about the 
future of p~ices fer ir~ute .- it is ~cseible for m~n°gers tc 
output. Si:m.ilarly, Federal ar..d local govenments , atte:m.pti:nq to 
protec t the liYinc standards of their constituencies, capriciously 
1 ~ Campbell R. McConneii and Staniet1 L. Brue. "Economi~: Principles. Probierm. and Policies. 
Ele·v·enth Editlcn, n St. Lcuis : McGraw· -, Hill Publishing Company, p.175 . 
13 fbi d_, p.175. 
10 
raise the benefits for the electorate . 
Other Experiences vith Inflation 
Argent;n~ en~ Brazil have had long battles ~ith inflation. 
Neither cou.."'ltry has yet recoYered from their ;,...flationary cycle . 
Similar to Russia , their inflation is rooted in an excess of 
aggregate de:mf'"'~ .- brought on by generationE cf a co1'"''"'"f'~ econo~y. 
·while :many of their attempts e..t heterodox inflation strategies haYe 
reduced inflation temporarily, none has been successful in 
Similar to Russia, Poland has had inflationary difficulties 
during its transition from a collllnB.nd economy. However, the public 
is fortunate, in that the recession associated with restructuring of 
the economy occurred under a strict political regime. Price 
increases have been restricted, as have increases in wages . 
Although thi3 is a painful approach to economic restructuring, the 
· sllock-trierapy ' approach had more success than Russia ' s current 
mixed approacll . 
While the Rus3ian qovernment has ·not yet achieved success in 
its restructuring, . some of the policies that have been illl.plemented 
are noteworthy. The first of these , ironically, is the issuance of 
new currency in Russia in the summer of 1993. While this policy 
destabilized the public ·· s confidence in government , it did serve to 
14 Moekoff and Ns2mi .. p. 7. 
11 
reduce inflation. 15 
The second of the government initiatives is internal 
convertibility of the ruble . This action allows for foreign 
businesses to excbanqe currency within the borders of Russia . While 
this action does not allow profits to leave the c01.mtry, it does 
allow more freedom for foreign investment . However, there bave been 
:many conflicting policies during the last year . The former 
Parliament , in an effort to undermine Ye1 · tsin, limited the freedom 
in riow these monies could be converted . 
Tight :monetary policy bas been used sev-eral tiID.es in recent 
months to lessen inflation. This is the :m.ost ef f ecti "te , a.~ :m.ost 
direct .· method to reign in -: nf la tion. Hm~ever, tight ID.onetary 
policy :makes stanc.ards cf livi."'1q fall in relation to previous 
expectatio~..e. This is a pernicious effect of inflation : once the 
cycle begins . it is Yery difficult to stop politically. In fact .. 
Yegor Ge.idar lost h;s position as PriID.e llinister largely because he 
i~ple~ented the fisc~lly co:r!2er.1ative ~easures necessa~y for tight 
monetary policy. 
In the DeceJD.ber 1993, the new Russian Constitution passed. 
-
tlodeled after the French Fifth Republic, the Constitutions 
establishes a legal basis for property rights and laws. This, 
coJD.bined with the general price liberalization and commitment to 
15 'vVhile 3tatb tical correlations are not avaiable to conciude thi;:i prembe, A.ummerMnt·· 
graphe f rc!n the periO!! indicate t!'.at i r:flation e!o\-.1erl rluri ng the pericrl. See eepecia!! !J 
February I, 1994, p. 44, Graph 6 2 . "The Reiationship of Credit Levels and lnfiation." 
No author. 
12 
pri va ti:,,;a tion the Yel ·· tsin e.~m; 'I"\; stre. tion bas de.m.onstra ted , serve to 
encourage productive invest.m.ent , ~'hi.ch makes the economy stronger, 
thus reducing inflationary pressures . Privatization by v-ouchers --
st-.e.res 'giv-en back · to the general public for o"..1nership in fcr.m.erly 
gcYer:run.ent property bas continued since 1992 . 16 A program 
continued by Yel' tsin , these v·ouchers e.re freely tre.de.ble on sev-eral 
exct-.e.nges in Russia 
Possible Policy Options: 
The first e.ction the Russian goverr..!ll.ent can te.ke to end 
inf le.tion is tc :make the ruble totally e.r..d freely conv-ertible . 
!1a.king the ruble convertible allc~s in~est~ent money to freely enter 
Russia . This T..Toul.d spur e.n influx of inv-est.m.ent into Russia . 
Continued enforce~ent of property laws in Ru3sia would further thi~ 
effort . 
.Another possible policy to mitigate inflation in Russia is to 
restructure the Russian agricultural system. The United Nations is 
in a qood position to offer technical assistance in this vein. 
Because agriculture is the linchpin for consUlller prices, this is 
especially important . 
as well . 
Such a policy would help consUlller confidence, 
The Russie.n govern.m.ent shoul.d encourage long-term. g:roT .. Tth in 
production by givir.q cc~T"tftnies ; 1"\l"'Ql"lt; 'U'QO tr, ~ .. -_ .... ,,_ . -- ...,_ in 
the trick17 transi ticn to pri '\78. tizs. tion. There are :m.<~r''l1" pcsi ti ~te 
16 Brigitte Granvme. "Price and Currerl(;y Reform in RU3si6 and in the CIS," Russian ond Ea.;t 
E1Jrnr•el.!n Fi f!l.!f!i:-';' J:!f!~ Tra,je. VoL 29 .-1, p. 31. 
13 
31.gns that the econol!ly can T.rnr}: _ First, profitable enterprises 
exist in RUEsia . 17 1flllle they are rare , · and much of the activity is 
speculatiYe , they proYe tr.at opportunities de e:iist . Second , Russia 
can return from. hyperinflation: as a ?1onetary sn<i political 
h 18 p encm.enon , the inflation can be reduced to leYels that reflect 
onl17 the structural problem~ in the eccnc~)7 . 
Russia is also in a unique position to encourage intra.-
republic trade. T"nis is true for both the states of the fonD.er 
Soviet Union and for Russia ' s own Federal states . 19 T"nis could 
further regional stability and would serve to reunite old producers 
and suppliers . Enviroillll.ental cleanup and oil production are areas 
in which these new nations could cooperate profitably. While a 
sinqle currency m.iqht aid in developing this cooperation, it is not 
absolutely necessary_2C 
Finally, the International tlonetary Fund (Il1F ) should loosen 
its requirements for fiscal cc~traints . W1'~le the It!F should not 
ab~n::io~ its role that fiscal 
enforced , shock-therapies of the r..ature that the Il1F ad,.rccs. tes 
i?~11erently· politically deste.bili=ing. 
17 !bid, p. 45. 
18 Graphs from t ~1mmer.'J/Jnt· · /~h<Ns j 1JmJ)S 1 n exchange rate "when Velts1 n and Gaidar are 
po1iticai1 y adive. See espechiil y Nikita Ki richeoko, et al. " I oftatioo & Crisis: Hope Dies 
Last," .t.'ommer.~8.llt-"·: Marc-h 1, 1994. This h also stJpported by Kennl?th H. Bacon "I MF 
Clears Rei ease of $1.5 Bi ii ion in Aid For Russia to Hei p Rescue Its Economy." Wall Street 
.Journal. April 21, 1994, p. A! e. 
19 \A/a111· "h rhr1· 0+1· f:"' I .,,....,.i R;+ .. t,la1111ar "011oo;a 10 'n+arn.,,,,ernmer:+01 fio,-al Dalati"no • A Ke11 to (t u • ., •.• - • v , 1v ._. uUU , , " '"" i\C'-i"j':f""' ' . •"- ~ ' "' v , ' "'v "1v, , ••••• ' "'v ,vv~, ,,v "'' "'.....,. · , ~ , 
Nationai Cohesion ," Cil&iienge . November-uecember , 1993, especia11 y P. 52. 
20 Paraphrased from Brigitte GranviHe. "Price and Currency Reform in RUS3ia and in the CIS ," 
P.1Jssh~n and Eas~ Euri:ip,:,':!n fi nan~ and Trad,:,. Vol . 29 # 1, !). 29. 
14 
Conclusion: 
This paper reYie~ed the underly-i_ng problellS with Russia ' s 
economy, and how they relate to inflation. I have concluded that 
inflation is now basically cost-push, but I believe that some 
evidence re:ma;n~ to s~'J)port the idea that de:mand still pulls 
inflation to an extent in Russia . However, expectations of 
inflation play the largest role in continu:Ln.g inflation in Russia 
today. Therefore , I feel that a combination of strict monetary 
policy and some heterodox methods should be combined to con~~er 
inflation in Russia. Th-is should be a long-term effort, co!nbined 
with continuation of tight monetary policies, a.."ld further economic 
and political refor~s. 
15 
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